Clear the mechanical floor before you book a human.
Run a full audit before the expensive engagement. You arrive with reentrancy, oracle, access-control, and accounting classes already cleared — and the criticals already proven on a fork.
00 The honest answer
The real question isn't AI versus a human auditor — it's which bugs each one is actually good at. Here's the concrete split by class, a side-by-side comparison, and how to combine them without overpaying for either.
These are the classes that recur across the historical-exploit corpus and have a stable shape to match — so the verdict can be proven against the code, not guessed.
For these, the verdict can be proven against the code — and criticals come with a working exploit on a mainnet fork. That's why running it on every commit costs $200, not $50,000.
These don't have a stable pattern to match. They live in intent, economics, and the seams between protocols — where judgment beats recall.
Guardix doesn't pretend to catch these. When it can't prove a finding either way, it
doesn't silently drop it — it marks it needs_manual and puts it in
front of a person. The concession is built into the product, not just this page.
An honest table hands rows to both columns. The accent check marks a Guardix advantage; the open dot marks a row where a human auditor leads.
Guardix
AI audit, run on every commit
Manual audit
Human firm, per engagement
Run Guardix on every commit, then spend the human budget where it actually pays — the novel paths a model can't own.
The two layers don't compete. Sequenced right, the cheap one clears the floor so the expensive one only does the work it's uniquely good at.
Clear the mechanical floor before you book a human.
Run a full audit before the expensive engagement. You arrive with reentrancy, oracle, access-control, and accounting classes already cleared — and the criticals already proven on a fork.
The mechanical floor never goes stale.
Each commit is re-audited and diffed against the last scan, so the human's report doesn't rot the moment you push a fix. Anything Guardix can't prove either way accumulates into a needs_manual queue — the exact shortlist for a person.
Spend the expensive hours on judgment.
Hand the auditor the categories a model can't own — MEV, cross-protocol composition, economic design — plus the needs_manual queue. They spend their hours thinking, not re-finding bugs a machine already proved.
You don't pay an auditor $50k to find a reentrancy a $200 run already proved with an exploit. You pay them to think about the attacks a machine can't.
Run a full audit in hours for $200, on every commit — and walk into your human engagement with the mechanical classes already cleared.